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CARL GOODSON HONORS PROGRAM SENIOR THESIS 
Secularization in 
Orleans, France 




Steeped in a heavily religious history, Europe and specifically France provide an intriguing 
backdrop for a closer look into secularization in present-day Orleans, France. Many various 
approaches to secularization theory have arisen over the past sixty years. This paper explores 
the evolution of secularization theory, delving into Mark Chaves' " New Differentiation Theory", 
based upon religious authority's influence on t he individual, societal, and institutional levels. 
Though created by an American academician, the "New Differentiation Theory'' provides a new 
basis of analysis with which one may draw conclusions regarding the state of secularization in a 
European city (in this case Orleans, France). Beginning with the broader European context then 
moving toward the specific case in Orleans, t his paper analyzes historical facts and personal 
interview data from 100 French in Orleans in light of Chaves' categorical approach. This paper 
utilizes Chaves' secularization theory in order to investigate the interesting trends of religious 
authority' s influence in Orleans, France, thus providing valuable data and analyses for future 
research in the field of secu larization theory and religion . 
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A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EUROPE 
There are very few who would disagree that a dramatic change has taken place in the 
religious environment of Europe as history has progressed from its roots in Christianity to its 
present state. Grace Davies in her book Europe: the Exceptional Case reveals such a change. She 
recounts a specific event that happened in 2000 at the Gallery of London. Davies describes an 
exhibition entitled 'Seeing Salvation' which depicted the story of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. 
Davies emphasizes that, despite its "unashamedly Christian" message, the exhibition was 
incredibly popular and attracted extraordinary numbers. A correspondence to the Director of the 
gallery congratulated the Director on his courage in displaying an exhibition with such an 
explicitly Christian theme. In contrast, a different situation occurred when the city added a bust 
of John Calvin in a heavily frequented location in Orleans, France. A Lutheran pastor with whom 
I spoke described the event saying news correspondents were outraged that the city would allow 
the explicit display of a religious figure in such a public setting. How Europe has transformed 
into a society so dramatically disconnected from its Christian roots is at the base of many 
historians' and sociologists' research. Looking back into historical examples of limited religious 
tolerance, emphasis of intellect over belief, skepticism of religion, and separation of church and 
state, one can see some of the complexities involved in the evolution of Christianity in Europe. 
Limited tolerance in Europe arose in the wake of the Reformation. After the signing of 
the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, Europe was divided into the Roman Catholic Church and the 
Lutheran (Protestant) Church. Though the common principle had been to follow the rel igion of 
the king, several German cities allowed Catholics and Protestants to have equal rights. During 
the second half of the sixteenth century during the French Religious Wars, a pofitique party arose 
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which believed that imposing religious orthodoxy threatened peace. Though the French 
Religious War ended with a Catholic victory, the Edict of Nantes of 1598 permitted partial 
tolerance for Protestants. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended many years of religious war in 
Europe. Though these cases showed the beginnings of tolerance, the Protestant minority's rights 
were gradually taken away, even completely in France after the Revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes in 1685. In other areas of Europe, tolerance arose out of practicality. After a long war 
with Spain, the population of the Dutch Republic belonged to various religious communities. 
Civil war in England during the 1640s and 1650s also created much religious diversity. In these 
cases, one state religion would not have been pragmatic (McLeod 5-6). Even as tolerance 
expanded during seventeenth century Europe, it remained limited. 
The eighteenth century Enlightenment saw the spread and growth of intellectual pursuits. 
The Enlightenment was an international movement that found its locus in the cultural capital-
Paris, France. Most of the philosophers were French. Enlightenment philosophers, called 
philosophes, such as Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu and Adam Smith, presented 
new ways to view government and socio-political interactions. Montesquieu's works along with 
those of the late eighteenth century deist, Fran9ois-Marie Arouet, known as Voltaire, attacked 
traditional religion. Voltaire, like many of the philosophes of the time, was a deist. In denying 
God's direct involvement in the world, deists further rejected religious authority. Some, 
however, completely rejected God. Denis Diderot and Paul d 'Holbach were adversely opposed to 
any notion of God's existence, uncompromisingly retaining atheist views. Even the debate about 
women came into question. Before, men were considered to be superior to women. Yet with the 
onset of the Enlightenment, individuals such as Mary Wollstonecraft, an eighteenth-century 
advocate of women's rights, challenged those notions. Although racism was still present, 
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Enlightenment thinkers ventured to propose rights to Jews and Muslims, the most despised 
religious minorities of Europe. Society's mindsets began changing concerning many different 
areas of life. Overall, reliance upon intellect gained a strong foothold in European thought 
(McLeod 5-7). 
While the Reformation had attempted to solidify religious sentiments, the opposite 
reaction occurred as people became disenchanted by religion. Europeans began questioning their 
beliefs and turning away from religion as they saw it to be strict, controlling, and intolerant. 
During the late seventeenth century, John Locke proposed that all humans were born tabula rasa, 
with a blank mind. Humans are thus created by their experiences and surroundings. This idea 
coupled with Isaac Newton's natural laws established a foundation based upon reason and 
intellect. Jean-Jacques Rousseau also asserted that children should be left to follow their natural 
instincts and emphasized the importance of a balance between the heart and mind. This belief 
would be foundational to the Romanticism that arose in the nineteenth century (Spielvogel). 
Thus, the rise of tolerance and the Enlightenment gave birth to skepticism. This 
skepticism was tolerated in some countries like England and the Dutch Republic, but in other 
places like the strongly orthodox Catholic France, deism arose more discreetly. Yet by the 
second half of the eighteenth century, deism and even atheism, though not as favored, became 
viable religious options for men of the aristocracy and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Looking at 
evidence from France and Germany, it appears that religious observation began to greatly decline 
around this period. Around 1750 in France, recruitment to the priesthood and to religious orders 
was declining (McLeod 7). It is important to note that there are some sociologists who, rather 
than considering this a decline of Christendom, view the trend as a movement toward a different 
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mindset regarding Christianity. In other words, while Europe was movmg away from 
Christendom, it was not necessarily undermining Christianity. Even though established churches 
were heavily attacked by antireligious intellectuals, Christianity still thrived. Religious devotion 
remained strong. John Wesley founded Methodism, representing a key revival of Christianity. It 
is also important to note that there were periods of revival within Christianity such as the Great 
Awakening. Between 1830 and 1960 still a sizable number of people within rural communities 
still practiced Christianity. The positive response to Billy Graham's 1950s Evangelistic Crusades 
is another testament to the durability of Christianity despite the apparent downward trend. 
Skepticism greatly increased in Europe, but Christianity did not die. 
Whereas the church and state had strong ties in the past, European leaders began looking 
to the separation of church and state. In the late eighteenth century, laws of separation of church 
and state were enacted in France (1795) and in the Netherlands (1796). Even though Napoleon's 
defeat in 1815 meant that the church and state would be under the same control once again, this 
formal relationship between church and state became less significant again in the latter part of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Ireland (1869), France (1905), Geneva ( 1907), and 
Wales (1931) (McLeod 8-9). This trend affected education. Education became more and more 
secularized as schools introduced a wider range of philosophies to students and, in some schools, 
removed the requirement to attend mass. This separation of church and state most recently 
occurred in Sweden (2000), but there are other countries like Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and 
England where a formal separation has not yet taken place. Even though the separation of church 
and state resulted from some violent cases as seen in the French Revolution and the Spanish 
Civil War of 1936-9, Hugh McLeod in The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-
2000 asserts that the general tendency has been a gradual movement away from Christendom. 
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THE EVOLUTION OF SECULARIZATION THEORY 
Taking history into account, sociologists and historians alike have created theories about 
this move away from Christianity and from religious belief in general. Since the mid-twentieth 
century, sociologists and historians have studied this idea of secularization in the effort to 
discover and present some sort of clarity to this trend. However, multiple theories have arisen 
and transformed as the centuries progressed, resulting in what some sociologists would describe 
as an end to secularization theory itself. 
THE ROOTS OF "SECULARIZATION" 
It is necessary to begin with a look at the etymology of "secularization". According to 
Swatos the word "secularization" comes from the Latin saeculum, meaning "an age (or era) but 
also, at least by the fourth and fifth centuries, ' the world,"' (Secularization). Monastic priests 
were distinguished from secular clergy in the sense that secular clergy went out into the world to 
serve the people rather than "stay under a formal "rule of life" ... but it was also used to mean a 
life or life-style that is at odds with God. Thus people would enter monastic life to flee "the 
world". Later the term made a distinction between civil and ecclesiastical law, lands, and 
possessions" (Swatos). In the Germanic Empire during the Protestant Revolution, the civil state 
practiced secularized policies by distributing ecclesiastical property. During the French 
Revolution there was the "nationalization and sale of the property of the Catholic Church as 
"national goods" (Bauberot 452). In more ecclesiastical terms, "secular" referred to a cleric in 
the Catholic Church who lived outside the "siecle" in the "secular state", or " life in the world" 
thus distinguishing " regular priests", or monks, from "secular priests", who led the parishioners. 
Later during the nineteenth century, the British freethinker G.J. Holyoake would adopt the term 
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to create the Secular Society, a group dedicated to a just and moral order that would address 
human problems without the inclusion of supernatural explanations. This term already assumed 
some "ambiguous, but increasingly negative, use by the time it was adapted into social science" 
(Swatos). 
KEY CONTRIBUTORS TO SECULARIZATION THEORY 
Sociologists began exploring the link between modernity and the decline of religion in 
the 1950s and 60s (Berger, Faith 69). Emile Durkheim and Max Weber were the first to really 
begin exploring secularization theory. Max Weber began the idea of secularization during the 
early to mid-1900s. Weber's view of religion was "more substantively conceptualized as bodies 
of beliefs and practices concerning salvation" (Chaves 750). The religious point of view, 
according to Weber, is in a state of competition against other claims which are all competing for 
authority. He also believed that the development of Protestantism had created a sense of 
disillusionment since Protestantism "reject[ ed] magic means of achieving salvation like so many 
superstitions and sacrileges" for carrying out religious principles (Bauberot 453). Furthermore, 
the rise of industrial capitalism, according to Weber, necessarily drew people away from religion 
since " industrial production develops on a mechanical basis, favoring an instrumental 
rationality" (Bauberot 451 ). Peter L. Berger, another secularization theorist, asserts that, "ever 
since the Enlightenment, intellectuals of every stripe have believed that the inevitable 
consequence of modernity is the decline of religion" (Berger, Secularization). He cites 
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, prominent thinkers who believed that the progress of science and 
rationality was an inevitable replacement of religiosity, seeing religion as an "opiate" or an 
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"illusion" (Berger, Secularization 23). These VIews created more reasons to explore 
secularization theory. 
As this topic expanded, several sociologists formulated their own set of views concerning 
secularization theory. Instead of religious competition, Larry Shiner in 1967 looked at the change 
in society's view of traditions. Shiner defined secularization as the decline of religion. He 
related this concept to the decline of "prestige and influence" of religion's "previously accepted 
symbols, doctrines, and institutions." It is important to note that Shiner viewed secularization 
theory with much reservation because of the confusion that arose from the term "secularization" 
(Swatos). Yet Shiner nonetheless contributed to secularization discussions. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Bryan Wilson picked up this discussion and asserted that society 
experiences secularization when there is: "( 1) a decrease in the portion of wealth devoted to the 
"supernatural"; (2) an increased independence of social behaviors from religion, linked to the 
idea that social practices change living conditions; and (3) an increasing justification of 
institutions functioning with little or no tie to religion" (Bauberot 453). Wilson claimed that 
modernization and secularization go hand in hand and "insisted that secularization refers to a 
process by which religion loses its social significance ... a process by which it 'has lost its 
presidency over other institutions" (Chaves 752). Wilson maintained a distinct difference 
between considering religion's influence and " the mere existence of religious beliefs and 
sentiments among individuals" (Chaves 752). According to Wilson, secularization is "the 
process by which religion loses social significance" (McLeod 14). He then connected this 
occurrence to modern societies, highlighting different societal aspects that have promoted 
secularization. Wilson insisted that it is the "system that becomes secularized" (Chaves 753). So 
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in this sense, the substantial "action" associated with secularization is at the societal level more 
so than at the personal, internal belief level. This distinction will become more important as one 
explores Mark Chaves' secularization theory later in the paper. 
Sociologist Karel Dobbelaere's (198 1) view of secularization also bears some weight in 
secularization theory. Like Wilson, Dobbelaerc presented secularization from the societal-level 
standpoint. He pays special attention to secularization as a societal-level process, "driven by 
functional differentiation, to which religious organizations and individuals react." Later in 1991, 
Frank J. Lechner asserts the same argument: "secularization theory ... as a theory of societal 
change does not primarily address religious behavior of individuals at all." Thus, all individual-
level experiences are considered irrelevant within the context of secularization theory. 
In 1994, Mark Chaves drew heavily from Weber's sociology of religion to formulate his 
definition of secularization as the declining scope of religious authority (Chaves 753-4). Chaves' 
theory is similar to Wilson's theory in that he refers to religious authority's influence on different 
parts of society. We will go into greater detail about Chaves' theory later in the paper. Soon after 
in 1995, Steve Bruce wrote Religion in the Modern World. He claimed that individualism was 
leading many to pick a religion based upon personal preferences, thus equalizing the religious 
market. Specialized positions within the church have arisen, which has decreased the functions 
of clergy and other church leaders. Connecting the increase of state power, as seen in growing 
corporations and bureaucracies, with the decrease of religion, Bruce argues that religion 
burgeons in smaller communities where personal , "face-to-face" contact is essential (McLeod 
14). This overview of the evolution of secularization theory is not exhaustive. However, these 
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views set the foundation for the way present-day sociologists and historians view secularization 
theory. 
CRITIQUEING SECULARIZATION THEORY: THE ISSUE WITH "RELIGION" 
Even though secularization theory progressed with much interest, some doubt 
secularization's legitimacy. One of the biggest issues involves the questions surrounding the 
term "religion". A couple of questions that inevitably arise within this discussion are ' What is 
religion?' and ' How does one analyze religion in terms of secularization theory?' It is well-
known that Weber himself never defined "religion". Durkheim ostensibly formulated a definition 
of religion, but this definition was "refabricated" by Talcott Parson, an American sociologist 
who served on Harvard's faculty from 1927-73. According to Parson, "religion unites all who 
adhere to it into a single moral community. Religion was the glue of society, the source of social 
solidarity" (Swatos). However, this definition did not stand when applied to pluralistic societies 
like the United States (Swatos). When C. Wright Mills summarized Parson's theory, he stated 
that there was a dramatic shift after the Reformation and the Renaissance when the "forces of 
modernization swept across the globe and secularization ... [and] loosened the dominance of the 
sacred." Parson believed that the "sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the 
private realm" (Swatos). In other words, Parson believed that the rise of modernization would 
inevitably result in the disappearance of religion in society except that which one practices at 
home. However, Parson made this assumption with no historical evidence. Swatos asserts that 
one is incapable of analyzing religion because of its variable nature. Religion, according to 
Swatos, is therefore non-empirical and an "uncontrollable" referent. Furthermore, if one states 
that people are less religious now than they were a hundred years ago, one gets into the trap of 
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presuming to know how religious people lived a hundred years ago (Swatos). One could say that 
analyzing how religious people live today is possible, but then one still deals with this question 
of who is truly religious and who is not and upon what is this based? So we come fu ll circle and 
see the difficulties in addressing secularization theory in terms of this complicated and 
oftentimes vague word, " religion". 
Because of the issues surrounding the term "religion," many sociologists have changed 
their terminology or altered their view of secularization. Callum Brown observes that some 
sociologists have changed their terminology from religious ' decline' to religious 'change', 
acknowledging the complexities surrounding the term "religion" when discussing secularization. 
Others understand secularization in a purely historical sense, viewing the changes as historical 
development. In light of this, Brown presented his own definition of secularization: 
"' Secularization' represents a number of different things to scholars. First, it is a theory which, 
broadly speaking, defines the decline in the social significance of religion as a long-term and 
inevitable historical process, with short-term accelerants (such as the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, industrialization and urbanization) and also short-term retardants (generally 
referred to as ' revivals ')" (McLeod 37). There are various perspectives addressing religion and 
secularization. What is clear is that one should not ignore this term but seriously consider how 
one should approach secularization in light of the differing views of religion. 
CHAVES' NEW DIFFERENTIATION THEORY: A NEW APPROACH 
Since one of the biggest areas of tension relates to questions surrounding religion, one of 
the leading researchers of religion and sociology, Mark Chaves, has formulated his own theory. 
Chaves is currently a Notre Dame University researcher and has written such works as 
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Continuity and Change in American Religion (2011), Congregations in America (2004), and 
Ordaining Women: Culture and Conflict in Religious Organizations (1997). He has also written 
countless articles and chapters concerning sociology and religion and was the winner of the 2006 
Distinguished Book Award from the American Sociological Association ' s Sociology of Religion 
Section. Chaves enters into this discussion of secularization theory by raising some legitimate 
questions: "Does the persistence of religion falsify secularization theory? Or does the form of 
religion's persistence render its persistence irrelevant to, or even supportive of, secularization 
theory?" (Chaves 750). This section of the paper will take a closer look at Chaves' "New 
Differentiation Theory" and what makes it a good choice for secularization research in Europe. 
In order to address some of the complexities of religion, Chaves takes a different 
approach. Unlike other sociologists and historians, Chaves has not given up on secularization 
theory as a legitimate source of further debate or study. He asserts that one should evaluate what 
should be kept or abandoned. Chaves argues that one should not simply throw out secularization 
theory, but rather rethink and reformulate it. Regarding secularization, many say that a country 
or region is secularized when it becomes less religious, or because religion is in decline in that 
country or region. It is one thing to say that religion is in decline, but defining what that means is 
complicated because defining "religion" itself is a complex process. This would inevitably lead 
to a discussion concerning belief which becomes even more convoluted. However, if one shifts 
the discussion to observations concerning individual religious practices, changes within religious 
institutions, and religious institutions' interactions with other spheres of society, one gets closer 
to Chaves' position. 
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With an empirical focus in mind, Chaves seeks to reconceptualize the object of 
secularization through what he calls his "New Differentiation Theory". It is "new" in the sense 
that secularization has not been studied before in quite this way; "differentiation" refers to 
Chaves ' categories and the way he focuses on religious authority's influence on other spheres of 
society; and "theory" to refer to his specific research seeking to analyze secularization in the 
world. First of all, Chaves defines secularization as the declining scope of religious authority. So 
rather than making a broad statement about the decline or increase in religion itself, Chaves 
looks at how religious authority influences spheres of society. He expands upon this idea of 
different spheres by validating his research based upon recent studies, secularization literature, 
what he calls "Weberian insight", and his claim to be more empirically founded in research 
technique. 
Like other analysts of religion, Chaves establishes that numerous institutional spheres are 
different from religion. Here Chaves establishes religion as one sphere among many. But the 
question still remains, how is religion to be understood? How should one understand this 
religious sphere? Chaves claims that religion is "one relativized sphere among other relativized 
spheres, whose elites jockey to increase or at least maintain their control over human actions, 
organizational resources, and other societal spheres" (Chaves 752). However, the idea of ' elite 
influence' is a highly theoretical concept. In religion there are leaders or "elites" who exercise a 
certain level of influence within the religious sphere, such as pastors, priests, teachers, etc. It is 
difficult to clearly identify who these elites are and what level of influence they exert within a 
religious sphere. Based on Chaves' information, I believe that he defines neither religion nor 
religious elites. He clearly desires that the focus be on the ends rather than the means within 
these three areas- social, institutional, and individual. 
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Other secularization theorists have presented theories that emphasize a societal view of 
secularization. Bryan Wilson asserts that secularization "does not even suggest that most 
individuals have relinquished all their interest in religion, even though that may be the case" 
(Chaves 752). Chaves agrees with this notion that separates religion's effect from the existence 
of religious beliefs (752). Wilson asserts that it is "the system" that becomes secularized rather 
than the individual. With this insistence on "the system," Wilson emphasizes societal 
secularization. Though Wilson has good insights, his perspective, according to Chaves, makes it 
difficult to "conceptualize the ways in which secularization is and is not manifested at the 
individual level of analysis" (753). Remember, Chaves seeks to address all levels of analysis, not 
just societal. Frank J. Lechner and Karel Dobbelaere present societal-level processes of 
secularization. Once again Chaves appreciates some of their ideas, but he still pushes for a multi-
level approach to secularization theory. 
Since Chaves' theory is quite different from many other approaches, it is necessary to 
understand "religious authority". Chaves looks at what he calls a Weberian approach to religious 
authority. As stated earlier, Weber himself never defined religion, but he did allude to religious 
authority by defining "religious organization". Weber defined a "hierocratic organization" as "an 
organization which enforces its order through psychic coercion by distributing or denying 
religious benefits ... A compulsory hierocratic organization will be called a "church" insofar as 
its administrative staff claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of hierocratic coercion" (Chaves 
754). In this, it is clear that Weber is thinking in political terms. But there are areas where 
Weber's analogy of political authority breaks down when speaking about religious authority. We 
can legitimately say that, to an extent, political authority rests upon the "threatened use of 
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physical coercion" to gain complacence, but "psychic coercion" does not work in the same way. 
It is very difficult even impossible to explain the how's and why's of psychic coercion. 
Instead Chaves asserts that a " religious authority structure ... [is] a social structure that 
attempts to enforce its order and reach its ends by controlling the access of individuals to some 
desired goods, where the legitimation of that control includes some supernatural component" 
(755-6). By "authority," Chaves means that which is " legitimated by calling on some 
supernatural referent" (756). This religious authority could refer to a god, multiple gods, or 
spirits, but it could also refer to the language employed by adherents or leaders so long as that 
language refers to the supernatural. One cannot define what those desired goods are since that 
depends upon the religion. Chaves claims: 
The "goods" to which a religious authority structure controls access might be deliverance 
from sickness, meaninglessness, poverty, desire, sin, or other undesirable conditions. Or, 
religious authority might offer a positive good such as eternal life, nirvana, utopian 
community, perfect health, great wealth, or other valued states ... The point here is that 
"religious goods" can be otherworldly or this-worldy, general or specific, psychic or 
material, collective or individual. .. [Thus] secularization as declining religious authority, 
then, will refer to the declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on 
reference to the supernatural. (756) 
In other words, a social structure legitimates its control by referring to the supernatural through 
the use of religious goods. 
Chaves shifts to the scope of religious authority. He separates the scope into three 
categories: societal, institutional, and individual. First, societal secularization refers to the extent 
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to which religious authority is able to influence non-religious institutional spheres. Chaves states 
that "secularization at the societal level may be understood as the declining capacity of religious 
elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres" (757). This could be religious 
authority's significance in political decisions or even in public works projects. 
Institutional secularization is harder to conceptualize. Chaves states that "secularization 
at the organizational [or institutional] level may be understood as religious authority's declining 
control over the organizational resources within the religious sphere" (757). Some assert that 
institutional secularization arises when religious organizations allow the secular world to 
influence internal affairs. This may be in the form of "adaptation" or "accommodation" to the 
secular world, or a "lack of depth" motivating religious activity (Chaves 766). However, Chaves 
asks, "But how, exactly, does one tell the difference between a sacred and a secular value? 
Between a religious and a secular activity? By what criteria are the current practices of religious 
organizations more secular than past practices?" (766). Chaves uses examples to explain 
organizational secularization. One can see organizational, or institutional, secularization in a 
Belgium Catholic school where the number of lay relative to religious professionals on the 
teaching staff is higher. Another example is in increasing numbers of denominational CEO's 
with predominantly non-religious career backgrounds versus those who have had solely religious 
career backgrounds. These examples shed some light upon Chaves' theory as it relates to 
institutional secularization. 
In regard to individual-level secularization, the question does not involve belief, but 
rather refers to the "extent to which individual actions are subject to religious control," or the 
"extent to which [individual] actions are regulated by religious authority" (Chaves 757, 768). 
Chaves' examples of individual-level secularization include religious authority' s influence over 
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reproductive behavior, voting, diet, religious intermarriage, etc. Overall, Chaves emphasizes 
analysis based upon empirical, objective data. 
In order to demonstrate the relationship between these levels, Chaves charts out his 
observations concerning societies and secularization at the societal and individual levels (refer to 
table at the bottom of the page). He observes that areas where institutions like education and 
science are influenced by religious authority reflect a low secularization at the societal level. 
This could happen historically as in traditional societies or "because a differentiated religious 
authority has managed to exert (or reexert) control over the other spheres as in medieval Europe 
or contemporary Iran" (Chaves 760). In contrast, more secularized societies are those places 
where religious authority tends to have a weaker influence on areas the state, the arts, the 
economy, etc. Similarly, the 
less influence of religious 
Secularization in Two Dimensions: Social Settings 
authority at the individual 
level, the more secularized the 
Societal-level Secularization 
High Low 
individual level is. Chaves 
Most areas of Medieval Europe 
takes into consideration that contemporary Individual- High industrial society Colonial U.S. 




vary depending upon the African American Some traditional communities societies 
Low 
community. Therefore, this U.S. Protestant Contemporary Iran 
Fundamentalism 
4 
model is not, as he calls it, a 3 
"sterile classification game", 
but it could help one predict 
(Figure I from Mark Chaves' "SeeularW!tion and Religious Authority" p. 761) 
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"the nature of the relationship between religion and social movements." So one could say that 
areas with high levels of societal and individual secularization utilize religion as a "cultural 
resource for social movements" (Chaves 761 ). In other words, one may use religious symbols 
and themes to increase public support of a social movement, but religious organizations and 
leaders will not play a significant role. 
CHA YES SECULARIZATION MODEL AND EUROPE 
Chaves is an American sociologist, so many of his examples of secularization stem from 
America. However, this study proposes that one can use Chaves' theory to analyze secularization 
in Europe. Referring back to the European history previously covered, it will be argued how, 
according to Chaves' model of societal, institutional, and individual-level secularization, Europe 
has experienced secularization on all three levels. 
CHAVES' THEORY AND EUROPE 
There are examples of societal secularization in European history. One of the major 
examples is the rise of tolerance, though limited, between Catholics and Protestants. After the 
Reformation and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, the Roman Catholic Church had lost some of 
its political authority to the Lutherans. Before the rise of tolerance, allegiance to either 
Catholicism or Protestantism was incredibly important and had caused numerous conflicts for 
many years. After the rise of tolerance, individuals began to break away from established 
tradition and belief that related to the religion of the king- a Catholic king obligated you to 
Catholicism; a Protestant king to Protestantism. Tolerance served to break religious authority of 
their political influence. Being Protestant was no longer illegal. Whether true religious freedom 
arose out of this tolerance or not, establishing nation-wide tolerance led to the reduction of 
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religious authority's influence since the religious sphere no longer dictated a society's 
denominational preference. 
The most salient examples of societal secularization in Europe were separation of religion 
from state and from education. The separation of church and state began in the eighteenth 
century and continued through the twenty-first century in countries such as France, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, and Wales. Currently, many Europeans countries have 
established some form of separation between church and state, though this separation may 
remain partial. Though some church-state connections still exist in selected countries, those ties 
have gradually loosened. This serves as one of the clearest examples of secularization at the 
societal level because two very distinct spheres, religion and politics, become mutually exclusive 
concerning the scope of authority. In other words, one sphere will not absolutely impose its 
values and views, its authority, on the other. The introduction of a secular educational system 
also signifies societal secularization. Whereas religious education was obligatory at one point, 
religious authority again lost its influence upon yet another important area of society. 
One can see examples of institutional secularization in events not previously described, 
namely the secularization of schools. Since Chaves does not make institutional secularization 
very clear outside of the examples he provides, one can cite the transformation of the University 
of the Sorbonne in Paris, France as an example of institutional secularization. At its start in the 
thirteenth century, the Sorbonne primarily taught theology. Taught under the same professor, the 
discipline of the Catholic Church was not taught separately from theology. Theology lost its 
major role in the university, allowing institutions in the Arts and Sciences to gain priority. Since 
Chaves cites the growing number of non-religious teachers in religiously affiliated schools as an 
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example of institutional secularization, the divergence from religious foundations proves to be an 
example of institutional secularization as is the case with the Sorbonne. 
Besides this example, one could also consider the implementation of limited tolerance as 
an example of institutional secularization. After the Peace of Augsburg, churches were required 
to legitimate Protestantism. Catholic authorities had to allow the people to choose Protestantism 
if they so desired. Their authority was necessarily weakened since they had influence over an 
increasingly smaller number of people as citizens chose to go to Protestant churches. The Treaty 
of Westphalia ended the religious wars in Europe in 1648. As stated earlier, some churches 
allowed tolerance out of practicality. In this situation, pragmatism grew stronger than the 
church's authority to keep the community under one sole religion. The changes that took place 
after the Reformation inevitably transformed the way church leadership, especially Catholic 
leadership, addressed religion within their own institution. Though this second example seems to 
fit Chaves' secularization theory, it is not completely clear. Therefore, one observes minimal 
secularization at the institutional level according to Chaves' theory and the available historical 
evidence. 
After the Enlightenment, intellectual pursuits led to secularization in the individual 
sphere. Though few in number, the philosophies of the Enlightenment were far-reaching. By 
emphasizing the individual pursuit of knowledge, religious influence on individuals decreased in 
intensity. No other evidence so strongly supports the growth of this secularization at the 
individual level than the complete rejection of religion and belief. As more members of society 
questioned their beliefs, even turning to other belief systems such as deism, Locke's tabula rasa 
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philosophy, and skepticism, society became more secularized. Some historians refer to this 
period as the pivotal point in Europe's trend toward secularization (McLeod 6-7). 
In addition, church attendance and the divergence from one religion to another points to 
individualized secularization. During the late 1800's, a decrease in church attendance was 
common to most parts of Europe, especially among the working class men and peasantry 
(McLeod 13). While it is agreed that this does not necessarily signal the decline of religion, the 
power of religious influence upon the individual and his or her quotidian decisions did not 
change this trend. It appears reasonable to argue that even the divergence from the traditional 
norms of belief seem to signal a certain degree of individual secularization. Many historians and 
sociologists postulate that many simply chose a different religion or belief system. One could 
argue that secularization is evident in this case since the religious influence upon the individual 
proved insufficient to keep him or her from changing belief systems. 
Having surveyed the history of Europe and how Chaves' secularization model applies to 
it, I logically conclude that, where societal and institutional secularization began, individual 
secularization inevitably followed. In Europe this conclusion appears plausible since religious 
authority greatly revolved around the church's influence in political issues. For example, Kings, 
such as Louis XIV and James I of England, led because they were given the divine or God-given 
right to do so. Church leaders were deemed to be the only legitimate authorities on Scriptures, 
thus leading to a great reliance upon popes and priests, even if such religious authorities were 
corrupt. So in the sixteenth century when citizens doubted kings as rulers by divine right and 
when Christians no longer solely relied upon scriptural interpretation by religious leaders thanks 
to Martin Luther, the scope of religious authority on the individual inevitably declined. This 
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trend away from the traditional norm in European Christianity surfaces as a key to the whole 
secularization debate. 
One might question the notion of secularization in Europe by referring to periods of 
religious revival (John Wesley and the Methodist Church, Billy Graham's Evangelistic Crusades, 
for example). However, these phases were momentary or short-lived (McLeod 37). On the 
whole, one can conclude that Europe has been secularized since, according to Chaves' model, 
there is proof in all three levels of analysis. However, more evidence exists for secularization in 
the societal and individual spheres. Chaves' definition of institutional secularization is somewhat 
vague. Therefore, Europe fits Chaves' New Differentiation Theory, though with some 
reservation due to the lack of numerous historical examples in support of institutional 
secularization. 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: FRANCE 
Before taking a closer look at the city of interest for this study, namely Orleans, it is 
necessary to explore the historical background of the country in which it is situated- France. 
The eighteenth century Enlightenment found its focal point in burgeoning Paris, France. 
Philosophers during this time encouraged an increasing independence of social conduct. They 
emphasized two "hopes": the first hope lay in the relationship between a better condition oflife 
and the direction of progress; the second hope lay in the connection between technical progress 
and " increased satisfaction of the needs of humanity and the advancement of well-being; moral 
progress that lessens the violence in human relationships and leads to a harmonious coexistence; 
political progress permitting the gradual, historical realization of freedom, equality, and justice" 
(456). Even though society's gaze seemed fixed upon a societal ideal that seemed bent upon 
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peace and universal prosperity, the French quickly found themselves amid turmoil and 
revolution. 
In the wake of the Enlightenment's utopian ideals grew an ever-growing tension that 
would affect the outcome of French society for generations to come. In 1766, the French 
governmental system was based upon absolute monarchy. Louis XV revealed the mindset behind 
absolute monarchy: 'Sovereign power resides in my person alone. To me alone belongs all 
legislative power with neither any responsibility to others nor any division of that power. Public 
order in all its entirety emanates from me, and the rights and interests of the nation are 
necessarily bound up with my own and rest only in my hands' (Price 82-3). And, as the clergy 
continuously asserted, this was God's will. Despite their claim to divine appointment, many 
rulers would not be able to hold society's loyalty for long. 
Louis XVI considerably weakened the absolutist image with his inability to choose a 
successful chief minister. This weakness seemed to contradict his divine right to rule. His 
decision to isolate himself from the populace only undermined his authority. In 1786, the 
Controller General Colonne warned Louis XVI of a financial crisis. In order to raise support for 
the measures he suggested, Colonne called upon an Assembly of Notables whose 144 members 
"would be selected by the king from amongst 'people of weight, worthy of the public's 
confidence and such that their approbation would powerfully influence general opinion'" (Price 
86). Colonne came under much criticism, so he was replaced by Lomenie de Brienne, 
Archbishop of Toulouse, whose endeavors experienced no greater success. Brienne called upon 
Parliament for support but its members would not back tax increases without calling upon an 
Estates-General. A date was set for an Estates-General, but Brienne's failures led to a new 
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ministry under the direction of Necker. By this time, the reputation of the monarchical system 
was completely disgraced. 
Destitution, riots, and disorder mounted as the country neared revolution. Poor cereal 
harvests hurt the economy which was already in shambles as some greatly prospered at the 
expense of the majority. The government's inability to effectively deal with the rising fiscal 
problems severely reduced its credibility. This failure also increased opposition and the drive 
toward constitutional reform. This was the tumultuous backdrop of the Third Estate issue. The 
Third Estate called for equal status among clergy and nobility. This Jed to the circulation of 
cahiers de doleances, pamphlets that presented and debated the political reforms each social 
group desired. In the end, there was a predominant sense of agreement between the desires of the 
three estates. The royal government's inability to effectively respond to the three estates' appeals 
increased revolutionary sentiment. 
During these turbulent years, a modern political culture was created and widely 
circulated, transferring sovereignty from the king to the nation (Price 79). Poor leadership and 
bad political decisions continued to disintegrate the people's confidence in the government. 
Public tension erupted. Rioting groups burned internal customs posts and searched for arms 
through an attack upon the Bastille in Paris. "Solid middle-class citizens" established the 
'Permanent Committee' in order to take the place of a royal municipality and "to create a 
citizens' militia to preserve order and protect the city against attack." A "new political culture" 
had been created through such actions as the establishment of the Declaration of the Right of 
Man and the Citizen (Price 1 00; 1 05-6). 
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Many viewed the Revolution and its transfer of sovereignty from king to nation as a 
nonreligious movement. Yet some historians believe that the Declaration of the Right of Man 
and the Citizen led to a notion of creating a "new man," that the Revolution and all its ideals 
would somehow "regenerate the human being" (Bauberot 460). This Declaration and the 
Revolution itself sought nonreligious values and was even seen as a direct refusal of 
Catholicism. Yet some historians believe that, in rejecting the Catholic Church, this French 
republicanism created a "secular religion" (Bauberot 460). 
If there was any hope in this new governrnent, it was clouded by the counterrevolutionary 
threat which incited radicalism. This radicalism made it very difficult to instate new leadership 
within the new government. In 1789, the Assembly began taking active steps to reorganize the 
Church. The Declaration of Rights had established a precedent for the freedom of worship, so the 
Catholic clergy felt their autonomy threatened. The papacy objected to the democratization of the 
Church. Further objection to the Revolution arose when the community's right to have a parish 
priest was threatened. Violence ensued as the struggle for power led to conflict between the 
politically opposing Montagnards (the radicals) and the Girondins. Then the Reign of Terror 
arose, adding more turmoil and chaos to the already tumultuous political environment of France 
(Price 120). 
According to Price, the Terror led to a campaign of dechristianisation in some areas in 
1793. A new calendar abolished Sunday. This reflected the anti-religious sentiments and anti-
clericalism which led to a "new revolutionary cult of Reason and the Supreme Being" (Price 
120). The Catholic Church has historically had a great impact upon France. One of the main 
issues that arose in French society dealt with "clericalism," or, according to Bauberot, "the claim 
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of religion to political dominion over the country" (459). However, anticlericalism arose when 
the Church began to have an abusively dominant influence upon political affairs. They saw the 
Jesuits impact upon the youth as too intrusive. From anticlericalism, individuals began 
questioning the Church institution itself and started moving toward a "free religiosity," or "a 
personal devotion where the relationship with the Divine supersedes ecclesiastical structures" 
(Bauberot 460). Later on, Victor Hugo would be one of the great advocates of this "free 
religiosity." The growing reliance upon scientific ideology also led to an anticlericalism that 
"perceived religion as an outdated explanation of the world that offered only a backwards 
orientation, irrelevant to the context of modem democracies" (Bauberot 460). Though, one must 
note, that these radical measures against the Church also led to strengthened support of 
traditional religious customs in other areas. 
A conservative First Republic arose but its politicians led to its own downfall. In 1799, 
the Consul was established after a coup d ' etat that was led mainly under the authority of 
Napoleon Bonaparte. After much military and political success, he was appointed consul for 
life. He later crowned himself Emperor Napoleon I. The Revolutionary-Napoleonic era affected 
the ways people thought about politics. Though the Revolution sought to limit arbitrary 
government, the leadership of Emperor Napoleon ironically led to a government "far more 
autocratic than the monarchy of the old regime" (Spielvogel 367). 
During Emperor Napoleon's reign, crisis continued arising due to poor harvests. France 
became more industrialized, and "the Church had less immediate relevance in an increasingly 
urban environment" (Price 155). Property remained the source of social, intellectual, and moral 
adequacy. Even though society seemed to be moving away from the church, there were still 
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some who held to religious sentiments. Many believed that "it was God's will that France should 
be cleansed of the remains of Jacobinism and atheism. They were inspired by an idealized 
conception of a Christian society, with the chateau at its centre in every village" (Price 159). In 
1801 , the Napoleonic Concordat established a privileged link between the French State and the 
Vatican. The state recognized the Church's "special place in French life and compensated it for 
its losses during the revolution by paying the stipends of the clergy" (Price 203). In 1802, they 
extended this law to include Reformed and Lutheran Protestants and then Jews in 1803. Fath 
calls what came to be an increase in the number of Protestant denominations along with other 
religious convictions the "religious market" (Fath 402). This religious growth was rooted in the 
abi lity to have individual choice in such areas as militancy and the refusal of the church state 
system. What came to be known as evangel ical Christianity arose after the Geneva Revival 
(181 7-20). French Protestantism included such key beliefs as personal conversion and the 
inspiration of the Bible. As the Protestant movement continued during the early nineteenth 
century, missions grew, leading to the creation of the Methodist and Baptist churches in France. 
During this period evangelical Protestantism had the opportunity to develop as an "ultra-minority 
group" and their "social role was broadly recognized" (Fath 401). Areas such as Brittany that had 
deeply rooted histories in the Catholic tradition began to include more and more evangelical 
communities by the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather than do away with religion, the 
French State increased its ties with the Church. 
Economic, political, and societal problems arose, but society kept fighting for a system 
that would improve life. The Revolution had occurred because the government had moreover 
shown excessive favor towards one element of this elite, the nobility, and in so doing threatened 
the status which other notables had enjoyed since 1789. From the 1840s, capitalism grew and 
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began to threaten artisanal traditions and work practices. Thus, the socialist ideal of a more 
egalitarian society founded upon self-regulating producers' cooperatives grew in appeal. After 
1834, a repressive government arose whose firm leadership kept society under control. This 
resulted in a period of peace but not freedom. Society demanded universal suffrage once again. 
The desire for political reform led to the creation of the Second Republic. The fight for universal 
suffrage finally had an effect, albeit not universal, in 1848 when males could vote. 
Ties between the Church and the state loosened again but would tighten when the state 
sought a means to establish moral order. Louis-Napoleon became the new Emperor Napoleon III 
under the Second Empire. The Second Empire enjoyed more support than previous governmental 
systems. The policy of liberalization led to the loosened alliance between Church and state, 
established during the Second Republic. The Third Republic began in 1870 after a military 
defeat in war. The succession of the throne was passed on to the House of Orleans. This new 
leadership was determined, with the assistance of the Church, to do the following: 
[To] establish a regime devoted to re-establishing moral order. France needed to expiate 
the sins which had caused God to inflict military defeat on her armies. Religious revival 
seemed to promise both external, and through persuading everyone to accept the place in 
society which God had chosen for them, internal security. It was increasingly the defense 
of religion rather than monarchism which supplied cohesion and a sense of purpose to 
conservatives during these early years of the Third Republic. (Price 195) 
It seemed that religion was again becoming an influential part of the political sphere. 
Even with these religious measures, France still installed certain secular measures. The 
French government repealed the 1814 ban on Sunday work and re-established the right to 
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divorce. A secular education system was established as a way to combat "clerical obscurantism, 
of securing the emancipation of the individual and safeguarding the principles of 1789," referring 
to the Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen. However, Price asserts that, during this 
period, "the status of the Roman Catholic church as the established state church was not 
threatened" (Price 197). 
However, in 1905, the disestablishment of the Church, or the separation of church and 
state, terminated the Napoleonic Concordat. There was no longer a valid distinction between 
"official religions" and "dissident religions" (Fath 402). In 1904, Catholic teaching orders had 
already been suppressed and schools closed. When war broke out in 1914, the clericals believed 
that men would turn to the Church in search of "hope and consolation" (206). The war greatly 
surprised the vast majority of French citizens. A great sense of patriotism flooded France against 
German militarism. Price states that ''the Catholic concept of the 'just war' and invocation of the 
spirit of Joan of Arc was widely accepted, far more so than the clerical conception of this time of 
trial as an opportunity for the expiation of sins. Nevertheless, the visible religious revival was 
short-lived. Yet, as Price continues, "the role of the Church in helping to maintain patriotic 
commitment should not be under-estimated. Neither should that of the schools and the pre-war 
processes of socialization they had promoted and which were now being put to the test" (21 0). 
The number of Protestant evangelicals grew from about 15,000 to 25,000 after the First World 
War, though these numbers were dispersed (Fath 402). Evangelical Protestant Bible institutions 
were created along with a well-established evangelical network. This growth included the 
increase of training institutions where students received pastoral, evangelistic, or missionary 
training. 
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However, war had weakened France and would do so again during World War II. Eight 
million men had been mobilized out of which 1 ,322, 100 men (16.6 percent) were killed by the 
end of World War I. The post-war French economy experienced numerous hardships in its effort 
to rebuild the war-stricken country. Politically speaking, conservative elites tried to maintain 
their power while protests arose anytime this power was challenged. In the end, the Popular 
Front, composed of Socialists and Radicals, won the elections. Then, the Second World War 
broke out in France. Millions were taken captive and thousands killed by the Germans. After 
such a catastrophic situation, the Church and the state "sought to collaborate in the re-
establishment of 'moral order' " (Price 254). Marshal Petain, leader of the Vichy regime, hoped 
that the French would adopt "some semblance of normality" among the chaos of war. "Catholics 
in particular welcomed the regime's adoption of the Church's teaching on morality, the family 
and the importance of spiritual values, and its benevolent attitude towards religious education" 
(Price 255). Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyons, insisted that " if we had remained victorious, 
we would possibly have remained the prisoners of our errors. Through being secularized, France 
was in danger of death" (Price 255). Once again France turned to the Church, if even for a short 
amount of time, to foster French morale. 
As the war progressed, the goal "changed from that of restoration of France to 
participation in an increasingly desperate German-led crusade against the Bolshevik menace to 
Europe." The Conseil National de la Resistance was created under the leadership of Charles de 
Gaulle. It aimed to "dismantle and to nationalise the ' feudal ' economic empires, to involve 
workers themselves in planning for a greater and more fairly shared prosperity and to create a 
social security system." Working toward the institution of equality across classes, the state 
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encouraged the move away from individualism toward the notion that "poverty was as much the 
responsibility of society as of the individual" (Price 256, 268). 
Finally, in 1945, economic and social stagnation came to an end. What followed was the 
trente glor;euses, a period of"sustained economic growth and social transformation" (Price 272). 
American aid through the Marshall Plan eased the strain of post-war reconstruction. The 
economic situation continued to improve, but inflation continued to rise. Price describes this 
period: 
Of the three generations alive in the 1960s, the oldest had been formed by the experience 
of the First World War. Most had direct links with the rural world. Their children, born in 
the 1920s and '30s, and relatively few in number, had been marked by the experience of 
the second war and post-war austerity. This was nevertheless the generation which broke 
with tradition, with the 'eternal France' . Their children, those of the 'baby boom' were 
far more numerous, and had grown up in a world of plenty. These were the first children 
of the consumer society, their values profoundly different from those of either their 
parents or grand-parents ... Traditional religious and moral values were questioned as part 
of a revolution in 'taste and expectations' . (288) 
From 1942, France experienced the most rapid rate of demographic growth. Generous fami ly 
allowances and a growing assurance in the future led families to have more children. During the 
1970s, the growth rate decreased as those of the 'baby boom' generation entered retirement age 
and the newer generation preferred a smaller family in response to a consumer society. Women 
also desired more personal autonomy and preferred to continue working in order to ameliorate 
family living standards. More reliable methods of birth control made this easier, and the 
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influence of the law and religion concerning sexual activity gradually declined. Many historians 
hold that the 1975 law legalizing abortion did nothing more than relocate back-street abortions to 
sanitary hospitals. While the family still remained the fundamental social unit, France 
experienced a growing popularity of cohabitation outside marriage and of divorce. Also 
important to mention is the change that occurred in homes. The focus of family life shifted from 
the dining table to the television. One could say that "[g]reater spaciousness and physical 
comfort was accompanied by changing life styles" (Price 290-2). 
Particular economic and educational initiatives greatly affected daily life. In 1981, the 
socialist party assumed power in France. France developed a welfare state. This helped reduce 
"perceived inequality" (Price 293). Social security aimed to protect family living standards, and 
economic expansion led to geographic and social mobility. The state played a major role in the 
change of education. They aimed to instill a "common culture and sense of civic virtue." The 
exception lay with private Catholic schools which were known for their firm discipline and their 
"snob value" (Price 295). Yet this educational system has received much criticism "both for its 
elitism and neglect of scientific and technical instruction" (Price 295). 
As leisure time expanded for workers, Sunday church-going declined. The significance of 
church-going declined, remaining merely a "formative cultural phenomenon." Religious 
vocations collapsed in the 1950s. Priests aged and their numbers declined. Price says what 
McLeod would later assert: that "a new Sunday, for a new society, and a mass culture emerged 
in the 1960s" (Price 300). Pop culture emerged with such stars as Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie 
Vartan. Holiday expenditures boomed. However, consumerism, individualism, materialism, and 
decline of religious practice did not destroy the family, "the ultimate repository of moral values. 
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In spite of divorce, family loyalties remain of central importance and are based on more effective 
and less authoritarian relationships" (Price 301 ). 
An increasing ambivalence toward institutions and moral rules has ar1sen, as well. 
However, one must keep in mind that morality remains an area of debate especially in the 
medical field. Medical institutions "have provided a secular brand of hope" in that the doctor' s 
particular religious convictions normally bear no weight upon his practice (Bauberot 458). 
However, many have become disillusioned since even the best medicine is no longer able to stop 
certain diseases like AIDS. The implication of heavy medication and euthanasia has Jed to 
debates that one could justifiably consider moral in nature. There was the belief that faith had 
"surrendered to progress caused by growing uncertainty and questions about the appropriate 
limits of progress" (Bauberot 462). The creation of the French National Ethics Advisory Council 
played a significant role in that it was responsible for reflecting upon the ethical effects of 
biotechnological progress. Here is an example of society' s hope increasingly resting on the 
progression of science independent from religious institutions. 
Since progress and freedom from religion do not prevent the issues of morality that seem 
to inevitably arise, individuals become disenchanted with this whole notion of hope. 
Consequently, there has been a "resurgence of traditionalist undercurrents" (Bauberot 459). New 
religious movements have come about. So here is a very particular situation of disillusionment, 
reillusionment, and globalization, as Bauberot puts it, that leads the masses to favor 
"sensationalism over analysis in the news, emphasizing its entertainment value" and an 
unrealistic notion of daily life (459). 
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CHA YES' SECULARIZATION MODEL AND THE FRENCH CONTEXT 
In the French context, it is impossible to ignore the deep roots of Christianity and of 
Catholicism in particular. Though France shares numerous characteristics with other societies, 
most notably European and North American, its own history and current affairs allow for certain 
distinctions in the realm of secularization (Bauberot 451 ). Therefore, much of this analysis will 
be devoted to dechristianization in France. This is done not to ignore or undervalue other 
religions that may have been present and dynamic during this period, but rather, to consider the 
religious environment of France as it relates to its historically prevalent religious affiliation. It 
will be investigated how Chaves' categories of secularization- societal, institutional, and 
individual-can apply to the history of France. 
Societal secularization arose when French religious authority over politics and education 
decreased. During the periods of absolute monarchism in France, the King exercised more 
authority over religious affairs than the church over the political arena. One can argue for 
societal secularization since the religious authority of the Church was not powerful enough to 
exercise equal authority over the ruler. So rather than having a political figure highly dominated 
by religious affairs, France had political rulers who dominated all aspects of life, including the 
religious sphere. On the other hand, Church affairs and politics were so closely connected that 
allegiance to the King meant allegiance to the Church and vice versa. When French society 
demanded the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the Church did not have a strong 
enough influence to change these policies. Bauberot states that, when the people established the 
revolutionary Declaration, this created a sort of "secular religion." Though society wanted 
change, history shows that this change was not particularly religious in nature. In fact, the 
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Catholic Church felt that its authority was being challenged, and it was. The Church once had a 
strong influence upon political and social life. The Reign of Terror abolished Sunday, a day set 
apart for religious gathering, from the calendar. Later, the 1814 ban on Sunday work was 
repealed. The Church's influence on society was declining. 
Societal secularization also occurred through the separation of church and state and the 
secularization of the French educational system. One of the most important secularization events 
occurred with the 1905 termination of the Napoleonic Concordat and the separation of church 
and state. The French today refer to the 1905 separation to argue against the Church's 
involvement in political affairs. The same decree that lifted the 1814 ban on Sunday work also 
eliminated the restriction against establishing a secular education system. Previously, the Church 
had been the sole source of education, teaching students Biblical principles. However, education 
began focusing on how to be good citizens and challenged traditional ways of thinking which 
necessarily included religious teachings. Bauberot makes a distinction between "freedom of 
conscience" and "freedom of thought." While "freedom of conscience" allows for "diversity of 
belief in society and the freedom to express those beliefs," "freedom of thought ensures the right 
to independently reexamine beliefs received from family, social groups, and society as a whole. 
This way, a person can freely adhere to these beliefs, adapt them or tum from them to something 
else." The French began to view school as an institution where students are taught to "exploit 
their faculties of reason and to help them exercise freedom of thought" (Bauberot 461). Today, 
many people do not consider private Catholic schools to be any more religious than public 
schools. Many parents send their children to religiously affiliated schools for the good education 
rather than for the religious benefit. Secularization is present in many areas of French society. 
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The same examples from "Chaves' Secularization Model and Europe" apply when 
discussing institutional secularization in France. The Sorbonne has already been cited as an 
example of institutional secularization. Other examples of religiously affiliated universities and 
schools decreasing or eliminating the importance placed upon religion would reasonably justify 
institutional secularization. However, no other significant evidence exists which defends 
institutional secularization in France. 
There is no doubt that individual secularization has occurred on multiple levels in France. 
The Enlightenment was a clear source of individual-level secularization. One of the main objects 
of Enlightenment philosophy was to direct the individual's attention toward the self--one's 
thoughts and actions. The philosophers did not encourage individuals to look to the Church or to 
God for hope but to modern advances and even to personal thought. Additionally, the 
individual's perspective of absolute monarchs transformed. The Church and the King used this 
idea of absolutism to gain control over people through this idea of divine rule. If individuals did 
not respect the absolute monarch who supposedly wielded divine right, there were eternal 
consequences. The Church played a large role in controlling society's actions and allegiance to 
the King. This tactic generally succeeded until revolutionary sentiments gradually weakened and 
eventually destroyed the King's authority. The people no longer feared eternal consequences if 
they disobeyed the King. Louis XVI was tried and executed by guillotine January 21, 1793. 
Individual secularization broke down the fear of eternal punishment. 
The Church experienced more individual-level secularization as time progressed. The 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen liberated people from the traditional religious 
authority. Anticlericalism arose as a result of rebellion against the authority of the Church in 
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societal and individual affairs. Bauberot claims that the founding of secularization in France 
began with the "political victory of the anticlerical movement." It is said that the anticlericalism 
in France during the Third Republic produced a mainly pacifist secularization, though 
secularization nonetheless (Bauberot 461-2). During the Third Republic, the right to divorce was 
reinstated, as well. In essence, the Catholic Church exerted their power to such a great extent that 
they, in fact, undermined their own authority. While evidence reveals a persistence of traditional 
religious customs in certain areas despite the Terror's efforts to undermine Christianity, in some, 
the growing reliance upon man and technology weakened the French's reliance upon the Church. 
After the Second World War, France experienced an increase in individual-level 
secularization. As society moved toward socialist measures, an intriguing situation occurred: 
France, a historically Christian country, insisted that poverty was a societal responsibility. 
Christianity's Bible teaches that followers of Christ should help the poor (Acts 9:36). Rather than 
encourage the people to help the poor based upon this Christian principle, they appeal to the 
individual and his or her allegiance to this all-encapsulating image of society, not the image of 
Christian community and good-will. The religious authority was not influential enough to keep 
individuals from questioning traditional religious and moral values or from becoming entrenched 
in this new consumerism, at odds with the Christian mentality of giving rather than receiving 
(Matt. 1 0:8; 2 Cor. 9:7). Whereas the Church taught sexual abstinence outside of marriage, the 
religious influence upon sexual activity declined. The Biblical teaching concerning sexual 
activity as a means of procreation also lost influence as women sought more reliable methods of 
birth control in order to remain at work. The decline in church attendance also showed individual 
secularization since the Church was not able to convince many of the importance of church-
going and Christian fellowship. Family still remained the most important foundation of morality 
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but with less focus on religion and more concentration on family loyalty itself. This contrasted 
the previous concept of each family as part of many Christian families within society. Price 
states that, as priests aged and declined in number, there arose "clear signs of a crisis and of an 
inability to combat secularization, especially on such crucial moral questions as abortion and 
contraception and this in spite of the development of a less rigorist moral theology" (300). 
AGAINST THE TREND 
Chaves' main argument asserts that, to call a society secularized, the society has to have 
evidence of secularization at all three levels- societal, institutional, and individual. We 
observed strong historical data supporting secularization at the societal and individual levels. 
Since the number of examples concerning institutional secularization is not as high as the other 
two levels, one can argue low-level secularization. However, French history shows examples of 
society working against this secularization trend, especially through Protestantism. 
Even though this idea of secularization grew to have great pull in French society 
especially after the Revolution, certain efforts to strengthen the bond between Church and state 
show France's particularly unique history. After the Reformation and the rise of limited 
tolerance, the Catholic Church lost its control of individuals' denominational choice. This 
indicated both societal and institutional secularization because of the lack of authority the 
Church exercised over individuals. In contrast, Napoleon enacted the Concordat during a time 
when secularization was already happening within France. The extension of the Concordat to 
include Protestants and Jews demonstrated how the French government saw, if not the historical 
foundations, then the societal importance of religion. Fath describes the period from the 
Concordat (1801-1802) to the First World War (1914-1918) as a "slow learning process of 
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religious pluralism in a controlled religious market" where the state played a key role (400). Fath 
believes that the extension of the Concordat system (180 1) to include Reformed and Lutheran 
Protestants (1802) and Jews (1808) points to the "first stage of laicization", or the decrease in the 
Catholic Church' s authority through the extension of rights to other churches (Fath 401). The 
growing number of Protestants after the Geneva Revival indicate that, even with the rise of 
secularization in certain instances, Christianity thrived rather well as history suggests. Overall, 
the historical context was very important in this situation. Unlike the historical context in which 
limited tolerance arose, an underlying secularization already existed when Napoleon enacted the 
Concordat. Therefore, the extension of rights to other denominations suggests a move toward 
religion, Protestant Christianity in particular. 
French history continues to reveal this back and forth movement between religious fervor 
and secularized hope. Though the ties between the Church and state had loosened, the Third 
Republic and the House of Orleans reestablished those ties. The House of Orleans desired a 
renewing of moral order, and not through societal progress but through the Church. Regardless 
of certain trends in secularization, it is evident that the religious influence upon society and the 
individual was strong enough to lead the government to see its necessity in encouraging moral 
order. Yet this did not dissuade the government from repealing the 1814 ban on Sunday work, 
from reinstating the right to divorce, or from establishing a secular education system. These last 
examples of individual and societal secularization reveal the move toward secularization that 
persisted despite governmental actions to support the link between society and the Church. 
Though bursts of religious sentiment continued, these instances were short-lived. When 
France became embroiled in World War I, political leaders used religious dialogue and 
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encouraged the Church's teaching on morality in order to bring hope to the masses of 
disenchanted citizens. The fact that these religiously-based campaigns were successful, if even 
for a short period of time, reveals the significance the Church historically played in the lives of 
past generations. This makes the idea of secularization in such a setting that much more 
interesting. It is possible that there is no such thing as pure secularization. Society is always 
mixed with some religion. Even if these situational revivals did not seem to have a long-term 
effect, they are important nonetheless. 
THE PROTESTANT EXCEPTION 
As stated earlier, Protestantism began growing in France. Fath offers additional data 
concerning Protestant growth and considers this as an exception to the secularization principle. 
Between 1960 and 2005, the French religious market continued to diversify (Fath 403). The 
numbers of evangelicals increased from 100,000 to almost 350,000 with large numbers corning 
from Pentecostals (200,000), Baptists ( 40,000), and Charismatics. Other important 
denominations include Brethren Assemblies, Mennonites, Methodists, and others (Fath 403). 
"Whereas the Catholic Church has had to close seminaries, evangelical Protestants have had to 
respond to increased demand for training." Such demand led to the creation of the Free Faculty 
of Evangelical Theology in Vaux-sur-Seine (Faculte Libre de Theologie Evangelique) in 1965, 
and then the Free Reformed Theology Seminary at Aix-en-Provence in 1974 (Faculte Libre de 
Theolgie Reformee) (Fath 404). Yet Fath admits this period is poorly documented. 
In the late 1980s, there were numerous evangelical Protestant campaigns in France such 
as Billy Graham's French campaign in 1986, Charles Colson's visit to Paris in 1980, the "Fete de 
l 'Evangile" near Nirnes in 1980, the "Fete de J eunesse" in 1985 in Vincennes, "Mission France" 
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with Billy Graham in 1986 in Paris and province, "Fetons l'Evangile" near Nimes, "Mondial 
sport et foi" in Paris and province, and "Pentecost 2000" in Valence. Nonetheless, the 350,000 
people that make up the French Protestants represent only 0.5% of the French population. In 
other words, French Protestantism remains marginal. 
Fath offers two hypotheses for this: first, some see this as a sect that necessarily refuses 
modernity. Secondly, some argue that evangelical growth is not easily "transplanted" into the 
French situation. Fath states that many historians view evangelicalism as "an exogenous 
disruption of the traditional French religious field" (Fath 406). They see evangelicalism as 
having mainly an Anglo-Saxon origin. It is true that the Anglo-Saxon world has had a 
tremendous impact upon French evangelical Protestantism, especially after 1945. Dozens of 
American evangelical missions started work in France. However, such influence was frowned 
upon when many saw that these efforts generated dependence, especially financial , upon 
Americans. Thus, the French evangelical Protestants faced losing some of their independence to 
a culture other than their own. This led many to reject the label "Protestant" to avoid the 
"American style" (Fath 407 -8). The third hypothesis is that evangelical churches found a certain 
"niche" in marginalized populations. Fath conjectures that evangelical churches became "places 
of community for transitional populations that are on the margins of a society into which they 
intend (or not) to fit" ( 408). Fath looks to the growth of ethnic churches as evidence of this 
hypothesis. It is important to note that the French republican tradition stands often "hostile" to 
such intermediary communities; they view them as "a threat to what is expected today of 
religious correctness: diversity, tolerance and openness" (Fath 408). 
42 
Some objections concerning evangelicalism in France are based upon the belief that 
evangelicals are secluded. Fath shows how this stigma does not hold since evangelicals widely 
network. This eliminates Weber's and Troeltsch's "sect" type used " to describe the religious 
framework of evangelical assemblies" (Fath 409). This use of networking even allows churches 
to join in the debates of global society. Furthermore, evangelicalism includes a major element of 
socialization. According to Fath, "most French evangelicals seem to be strongly engaged with 
their society and their own national culture. French evangelicals educate their children in the 
public school system contrary to American evangelicals, who often choose to educate their 
children in private institutions or at home" (Fath 41 0). 
Some believe that American assistance and influence upon evangelicalism has caused 
some French evangelicals to become more American-like. However, this is not a strong 
argument since the French have since moved away from dependence toward independent 
growth. They have been able to appreciate the positive influence Americans have made upon the 
French situation while retaining their own cultural identity. Fath even states that there is a 
"French way" of being an evangelical, such as their tradition of drinking alcohol and wine, 
unlike traditional American evangelicals. 
Overall, French evangelicals present an interesting case for those bent upon proclaiming 
absolute secularization or even the death of religion. Fath suggests that perhaps this indicates a 
transition in Europe "from a tightly structured religious market dominated by the unbalanced 
church-sect couple, to a more open and competitive market in which several denominations 
(among other types of religious organizations) coexist" (414). 
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ORLEANS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The history of Orleans is closely linked to the history of France as a whole. One aspect 
that differs is the weight given to Joan of Arc, La Pucelle. The story of her bravery in rallying 
the French forces against the English during the Hundred Years' War stands out as an inspiring 
piece of early history. Later during the late 16th century and the War of Religions, the city of 
Orleans was taken by Huguenots and greatly damaged. When Louis Philippe became king in 
1830 after the Glorious Revolution and with the beginning of the Restoration after the flight of 
Charles X and the Bourbons, the throne of France returned to the line of Orleans. Orleans 
suffered more destruction when it was attacked by the Prussians in 1870-71, by Italian forces in 
1940, and by the U.S. army in 1944. Since World War II, the old city has been extensively 
restored. Orleans was also the birthplace of Charles Peguy, a Christian poet, philosopher, 
socialist, and patriot, who, regardless of the radical anticlericalism of the late 191h and early 20th 
centuries, held firmly to his faith and integrity, testifying to the power of his faith. He, thus, had 
a great impact upon French intellectual thought (Konnert 148-9). Currently, an estimated 
120,000 people live in Orleans (116,515 according to the 2008 official census) ("Populations 
legales 2008"). This is the historic city in which I conducted numerous interviews for my 
research. 
RESEARC H IN ORLEANS 
CHOOSING THE QUESTIONS 
Before going to France, I had just begun my study of Chaves' "New Differentiation 
Theory". As I formulated questions to ask the Orleanais, I avoided choosing questions solely 
based upon Chaves' theory so as to avoid creating evidence that would automatically support a 
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theory that I had not yet fully explored. I chose ten questions that would not be too invasive 
while giving me a deeper perspective of the religious environment of Orleans. Upon returning to 
the States, I was able to further analyze Chaves' theory and the possibilities of incorporating it 
into my research. Eventually, I decided that Chaves' secularization theory would provide an 
interesting case study for secularization in Orleans, France. 
THE QUESTIONS 
The semester before going to Orleans, France, I formulated ten questions that would give 
me a better perspective of the religious environment of Orleans according to the Orleanais. I 
asked the following questions: 
1. Are you familiar with any churches in Orleans? 
2. Do you go to church? 
3. Are you Catholic, Protestant, or other? 
4. Do you consider yourself a religious person? 
5. Do you believe that there are a lot of Christians in Orleans, or in France in general? 
6. Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing? 
7. Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what 
other religions? 
8. What do the majority of French, or specifically Orleanais think of religion? 
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9. Does the image of religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks 
about Catholicism or Christianity in general? 
10. Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not? 
These questions led to very interesting and informative interviews that gave me a first-hand 
perspective of religion in France. 
AMONG THE PEOPLE 
During my semester abroad in the fall of 2009, I set off to the bustling streets of 
downtown Orleans, interviewing anybody who would take the time to answer ten questions. 
During weekends and after classes, I interviewed passers-by, loungers outside of the mall, and 
walkers along the banks of the Loire. I also interviewed some church-goers at a local church I 
attended. I interviewed a wide age range and tried to interview an even number of males and 
females (however, I inevitably ended up interviewing a greater number of women). In all, I 
spoke with 100 French citizens as well as three Protestant pastors and one Catholic priest in 
Orleans. All interviewees signed a consent form indicating they understood that their information 




Yes No No Response/ Don't Know 
(Q I) Are you familiar with any churches in Orleans? 
81% 14% 5% 
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Yes Occasionally No Rarely Only to Family Events 
(Q 2) Do you go to church? 19% II% 58% 6% 5% 
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other? Catholic Protestant Atheist/ Muslim Other 
nothing_ 
47% 9% 29% 7% 4% 
Yes 
No 
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person? 26% 
74% 
No Response/ 
Yes No Don' t Know 
(Q 5) Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in 
59% 20% 20% Orleans or in France in general? 
Increasing Decreasing Stagnant Don ' t Know 
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or 
8% 
decreasing? 62% II % 12% 
Islam Don ' t Buddhism Sects Atheism Other Know 
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that' s taki_ng the 
place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions? 37% 20% II% 7% 54% 5% 
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleanais Refer to Appendix B for detailed responses. 
think of religion? 
No Response/ 
Yes No Don' t Know 
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings 
(cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about 26% 64% 9% 
Catholicism or Christianity in general? 
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No Response/ 
Yes No Don 't Know 
(Q I 0) Do you believe religion should play a role in 
12% 84% 3% politics? Why or why not? 
CA TEGORiZING THE QUESTIONS 
After organizing the data, I incorporated it into Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory". I 
matched the questions to Chaves' categories- societal, institutional, and individual-level 
secularization- based upon the potential to reveal enlightening links between the interview data 
and secularization. 
I placed three of the questions within the societal level category. First, I chose the 
question about religion and politics. I justified this placement based upon the way education and 
politics are subjects that can reveal societal secularization, as seen earlier in the context of 
secularization and France. Furthermore, I included two of the questions that would reveal the 
extent to which Christians and churches influence the everyday life of the Orh~anais. These 
questions were whether 1.) interviewees were aware of other churches in the area besides the 
main cathedral, St. Croix, and whether 2.) he or she believed there were many Christians in 
Orleans. In this sense, these last two questions address the scope of influence Christians and 
churches have within everyday life of the Orleanais. If a substantial number of people are 
opposed to any influence between religion and politics, and if they are not aware of any 
churches, perhaps societal secularization exists. 
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Fitting a question into the institutional category was challenging since Chaves' examples 
are specific. Earlier, I stated that the divergence away from Christian theology as a university 's 
major domain reveals institutional secularization. This has been the case with the University of 
Orleans which emphasized theology but later law and the sciences, engineering, and the arts. 
Since the gradual divergence from hiring Christian teachers in religiously affiliated schools 
indicates secularization, one can reasonably conclude that the transformation of religious 
buildings such as cathedrals into non-religious buildings would also indicate institutional 
secularization. The data reveals that many individuals today consider the cathedral in Orleans to 
be simply a beautiful monument for tourism. This actually applies to all of Europe since many 
cathedrals are now historical monuments. One cathedral in Glasgow, Scotland has even been 
converted into a night club and pub. One can logically justify the use of this fact in analyzing 
institutional secularization. Although Chaves does not cite this as a specific example of 
institutional secularization, I believe there is some evidence regarding it. 
More questions naturally lean toward the individual-level category. Within the 
individual-level secularization analysis, I included the questions about the interviewees' 
denomination; whether they consider themselves religious or not; opm10ns concemmg the 
French views of religion; and church attendance. Since these questions are related to personal-
level secularization opinions, convictions, or practices, they easily work within the individual-
level category. 
Two of the questions did not easily fit into Chaves' categories. Whether interviewees 
believed Christianity was increasing or decreasing and if they believed another system of belief 
was augmenting in its place were two questions that revealed interesting information about the 
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Orleanais personal views even if the questions do not fit into Chaves' categories. Even so, these 
questions provide new and interesting data utilized in this study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
After utilizing Chaves' secularization theory as the analytical framework of my research 
data, I conclude that Orleans has low-level secularization. The answers to the questions 
concerning societal secularization and politics were not surprising. From my other research, 
separation of Church and State has always seemed to be a strong view for many French. 
However, the results concerning societal awareness of churches were higher than one would 
expect from a completely secularized city. With 65 percent being aware of other churches 
besides the main cathedral, it seems as though Orleans institutions are moderately effective in 
spreading the word or at least making their presence known. One would expect a higher 
percentage of interviewees within a heavily secularized city to be unaware of any sort of 
religious presence within the city. Surprisingly, 59 percent of interviewees believe that there are 
many Christians in Orleans and France in general. The scope of religious authority, specifically 
that of Christianity, on politics is definitely minimal, even nonexistent. However, the results of 
the other two questions show that churches still hold enough authority to make many Orleanais 
aware of their presence and to also convince citizens to believe that there are many Christians in 
Orleans and France. 
Institutional secularization is difficult to determine in Orleans since Chaves' theory is not 
as clear at this point. It has already been established that the once religiously oriented schools 
such as the University of Orleans are presently completely secularized. Additionally, cathedrals 
once had a strong religious influence in people' s lives but are now less so. Orleans' history 
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makes a difference on how one analyzes secularization. Had this city's university not had a 
strong religious affiliation, this example would not prove to be a claim to institutional 
secularization. Thus, one can conclude that Orleans is institutionally secularized according to the 
declining and possibly nonexistent authority the Church currently holds regarding universities 
and cathedrals. 
The study showed mixed results for secularization at the individual level. When asked 
about church attendance, 30 percent said they went to church or at least went to church 
occasionally. This low percentage would seem to suggest secularization; however, the European 
Values Study from 1999 reported that 12 percent of the French go to church at least once a 
month (McLeod 71). So even though Orleans' percentage seems low, it represents more than 
twice the percentage from 1999. Seventy-one percent of interviewees in Orleans claimed to be a 
part of some kind of religious denomination with the majority claiming Catholicism. This 
percentage is also higher than the 1999 study which showed 57 percent belonging to a religious 
denomination. The percentage of those claiming Catholicism in France in 1999 (53 percent) is 
about the same as in Orleans (47 percent). Yet, in Orleans, 9 percent claimed Protestantism while 
only 2 percent in France belonged to Protestantism in 1999. However, this being the case in 1999 
one cannot completely know since data for Orleans in 1999 is not available. To continue, 29 
percent of Orleans claimed either atheism or no religious affiliation, whereas 43 percent in 
France reported that they did not belong to any religion. Therefore, it appears that Orleans 
represents a specific case in France where a greater percentage of people claim a religious 
denomination. As stated earlier, former historical or sociological studies revealing trends or 
differences make a difference upon how one views secularization in Orleans. Moreover, the fact 
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that more than half of interviewees in Orleans claimed a Christian denomination indicates signs 
of low-level secularization. 
The responses to the question "Do you consider yourself a religious person?" caution us 
from jumping to conclusions about religious belief and practice in Orleans. Though 71 percent 
claimed a religious denomination, a low percentage claimed to be religious. This reinforces the 
low-level secularization rather than a non-secularized status. Of the 71 percent claiming a 
denomination, 58 percent claim not to be religious. Twenty-six percent of interviewees in 
Orleans claimed to be religious, representing about half of the percentage from the 1999 study 
(44 percent). Seventy-two percent of Catholics said that they did not consider themselves to be 
religious people. In contrast, 78 percent of the Protestants and 71 percent of the Muslims 
interviewed considered themselves to be religious. Although the previous results show increasing 
numbers in church attendance and adherence to religious denominations, still a great percentage 
of Orleanais do not consider themselves to be religious. Since the results do not show increasing 
or high levels of individual-level secularization in all the categories of questions, I am reluctant 
to categorize Orleans as a high-level of individual secularization. 
Considering the responses to the question "What do the majority of French or Orleanais 
think of religion", one can see religion does not hold too much influence in their lives. Joining 
these responses with the 62 percent who believe that Christianity is declining, it is reasonable to 
state that Orleans is secularized at all three levels, societal , institutional, and individual , but at a 
low-level. 
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A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE 
In addition to the 100 French I interviewed, I also had the opportunity to interview three 
Protestant pastors and one Catholic priest to hear their perspective on the religious environment 
of Orleans and to see how their responses differed from the other interviews, if at all. The pastors 
whom I interviewed stayed in close contact with other churches within the Christian community 
of Orleans, so their points of view have allowed me to see another facet of religious life in 
Orleans from credible sources. 
I interviewed one Baptist pastor from Orleans who said that, in his church, between 80 
and 100 adults plus 20 children regularly attend the services. I asked him whether he thought 
Christians in Orleans felt free to talk about their beliefs with others. He responded positively, 
stating that, in general, Christians in Orleans do feel free but only in the sense that they are not 
restricted by law. Though talking about one's faith, he added, demands courage to stand up 
against mockery and indifference. In answer to why mockery and indifference exist within the 
city, he cited the fact that France is democratic and citizens have great freedom, but that some 
are afraid to affirm their faith because of poorly understood secularism (here secularism refers to 
that which is separated from religion, or !arc; not to be confused with Chaves' definition of 
secularization). Furthermore, this pastor affirmed a growing tendency for young people to be less 
religious than their parents. When asked about the church and politics, his response confirmed 
the responses of the majority of interviewees who said that religion should not play a role in 
politics since there are so many belief systems in France. The Baptist pastor stated that he did not 
believe that a specifically Christian political party would have a large impact in France. Overall, 
he expressed that Christianity is declining in France even though it is rising in other countries. 
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I also spoke with a pastor of an evangelical church with a congregation of about 100 
adults or 140 including children. He agreed that Christians in Orleans and France as a whole are 
free to talk about their faith, but are timid. The secularized (!ale) nature of the state makes one 
reluctant to talk about one's faith in public. He said that proselytizing is viewed badly in France 
though not restricted. When asked about the trend of Christianity, his responses were very 
interesting. He said that Catholicism and historical Protestantism, or the Reformed Church, were 
declining while evangelical churches like Pentecostalism were progressing. He said that many 
think Protestants compared to Catholics, are "nicer, cooler, livelier." He believes some find the 
Jack of hierarchy within Protestantism more appealing than Catholicism which, according to 
some, is old, outmoded, not in contact with life or with young people. Yet even having said all 
this, he still sees some Catholic churches that are trying to increase in congregational numbers. 
The evangelical pastor sees himself and other Christians as a minority in France, but he prefers 
this. He believes that it is more important to have authentic faith than to have great numbers. 
I also had the opportunity to interview a pastor of a Reformed Church in Orleans. 
Approximately 400 families have registered with his church, though only about 150 individuals 
regularly attend. He stated that these numbers line up with the majority of churches in France 
whose regular attendees equal about one-half of the total registered number. In his church, the 
older individuals make up the majority. The younger go to the services less frequently. Still , a 
sizeable number of 15-30 year olds attend the services. 
Regarding freedom to speak about beliefs, the Reformed pastor said that few in France 
speak often about their faith. Children learn very early that one must not talk about beliefs with 
their elementary and high school professors. They are, according to Reformed pastor, practically 
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trained not to talk about their faith. The prevalent idea is that religion is private, thus one should 
not talk about it just as one would not talk about money. In response to a question addressing the 
difference between what the French think about Catholics versus Protestants, he stated that many 
negative images of Catholicism exist, so Catholics must justify themselves as Catholics. The 
image of Protestantism is better, more pleasant. 
He believes that the number of those who practice Christianity is declining. In his church, 
the number of marriages and baptisms is in decline. On the other hand, the number of those 
interested in church events has increased. Overall, he worries about the increase in individualism 
and independence he is witnessing within the church. He has observed a loss in the sense of 
community. Individualism is currently very strong in France. 
The Reformed pastor made some interesting observations among those who claim the 
Catholic tradition. Catholics, he says, desire a certain liberty they see in Protestantism. In fact, 
Catholics are in the process of pursuing practices that resemble Protestantism. Furthermore, the 
Catholic Church as a whole is in the process of revising its methods of counting the number of 
Catholics in France. The Church, according to the Reformed pastor, will begin taking into 
account non-practicing Catholics. Because of this, he sees the possibility of a state where the 
majority is in fact not Catholic. 
While the other Protestant pastors said that the majority of French consider cathedrals to 
be historical monuments or just a building that gives a church more credibility, the Reformed 
pastor said that a sort of paradox exists concerning religious buildings like cathedrals. He 
affirmed that the buildings have a symbolic function even though people practice religion less 
frequently. According to this pastor, the buildings reassure the people of the existence of God as 
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would a photo of one' s grandfather- a photo that shows one's roots. He recounted one specific 
event when the city hall of Orleans wanted to demolish an old church. A sociologist interviewed 
the people and every interviewee was against this action-"One must keep the building!" This 
adds an intriguing twist to the data concerning secularization in Orleans. 
Finally, I interviewed a Catholic priest. After interviewing the Protestant pastors, I had 
the strong impression that the influence of religious authority in the lives of the Orh~anais was 
minimal at best. However, I was surprised to hear that this church had three separate masses to 
accommodate the 1 ,000+ congregants. Each of the services varies in the age range of attendees. 
Few young people attend the early service, opting for the evening service. The second service is 
composed of many couples with children. This priest agreed with the Protestant pastors that the 
majority of French were becoming more and more individualistic. In fact, he said that the 
number of priests was in decline. Catholics were being forced to reorganize into smaller groups. 
He stated that many consider religion to be a taboo. The French are hesitant and do not dare talk 
about their faith with others. 
Being a Catholic priest, he was able to reveal the attitudes many had toward Catholicism. 
First of all, he asserted that, when one thinks about Christianity in France, one thinks about 
Catholicism since, historically, the majority has been Catholic. Yet when one thinks about 
Catholicism today, one thinks about weighty positions of hierarchy (bishops and priests who are 
distant from everyday life). This has Jed many to consider Protestantism in a more positive way 
since less is known about it compared to Catholicism (which includes its history of unreasonably 
wealthy churches and, more seriously, pedophi lia). However, Catholics are still finding ways to 
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adapt and live. Still this priest acknowledges that the large number of congregants in his church 
represents a very unique situation in France. 
WHAT'S REPLACING CHRiSTIANITY? 
So what is replacing Christianity, if anything? Of all the interviewees, 37 percent said 
that Islam was gradually taking the place of Christianity. Many cited examples of immigration to 
justify this rise. Eleven percent said Buddhism, and 7 percent said different sects. The majority 
of responses, 54 percent, reveal that the French believe the trend is still in favor of atheism. The 
Baptist pastor whom I interviewed agreed that Islam was increasing. Yet due to indifference and 
a lack of knowledge concerning what Christianity really is, the overall trend shows an increase in 
atheism. The evangelical pastor also agreed that Islam was increasing. However, he believed that 
the kind of atheism which was once very anti-Christian is decreasing, being replaced by an 
increasing "21st century spiritualism". He added that many assume a sort of relativism ("I believe 
this; you believe that, and this is good"). He stated that Europe has been given the nickname "the 
dark continent" since many believe Europe to be completely secularized. However, the 
evangelical pastor believes that Europe is somewhat wrongly named since there are still 
Christians in Europe. The Reformed Pastor stated that the majority of French are more likely to 
be agnostic but that the number of people who hold to some type of spirituality is increasing. 
Buddhism is also increasing in adherents. Many are choosing their own system of beliefs or are 
turning to esoteric philosophies such as those found in yoga and in "well-being" spiritualism. On 
the whole, the priest said that, even though Muslim numbers increase, nothing is really taking 
Christianity's place except indifference. The interviews with the Protestant pastors and the 
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Catholic priest along with those of the 100 French citizens revealed intriguing perspectives that 
greatly aid this research on secularization in Orleans, France. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Chaves' ''New Differentiation Theory" within the European context provided an 
intriguing framework for this case study on secularization in Orleans, France. After analyzing the 
European and French historical backgrounds, it seemed unlikely that one would be able to 
reasonably apply Chaves' theory at the city level since so much uncertainty remained concerning 
institutional secularization. Delving into institutional-level secularization proved to be 
complicated when considering a country or continent. However, analysis proved to be more 
reasonable on the smaller, city scale by looking at the secularization of universities and religious 
buildings such as cathedrals. Therefore, one could state that Chaves' categories proved more 
feasible on the city level. On the other hand, it is possible that examples of institutional 
secularization such as described by Chaves exist on the continental and country level but that 
more research is necessary. One can moderately accept secularization on all three levels for all 
three contexts- European, French, and Orh!anais- but with reservation. 
Overall, it is clear that Chaves' secularization theory provides a unique opportunity to 
explore different levels of analysis. By categorizing the interview responses, one can approach 
the research data from a new perspective. Despite the lack of details concerning institutional 
secularization at the continental and state levels, one can still use the examples Chaves provides 
to show secularization in Orleans, France, though at a low-level. While society shows a move 
toward atheism, high church attendance at one of Orleans' cathedrals continues. Thus, one could 
argue against high-level secularization. Taking all the historical, sociological, and interview 
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research into account, this study m secularization theory, specifically of Chaves' "New 
Differentiation Theory", provides an interesting framework by which one can explore 
secularization in Europe, France, and, specifically, Orleans. I hope other researchers will be able 
to utilize this information to continue studies on the religious environment of Orleans, France. 
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Appendix A 
DATA SU MMARY 
(Categori=ed according to Chaves' "Nelv Differentiation Theory") 
Societal Questions 
Overa ll Results (100) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No Response/Don't Know 
(Q 10) Do you believe religion 12 84 3 
should play a role in politics? 
Why or why not? 
(Q I) Arc you familiar with any 81 14 5 
churches in Orleans? 
Institutional Questions 
Overall Results (100) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response/Don't Know 
(Q 9) Does the image of these rel igious 26 64 9 
buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on 
what one thmks about Cathohcasm or 
Christianity an general? 
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Individual Questions 
Overall Results (100) 
Question YES Occasionally NO Rarely Onl) to Fam1ly Events 
(Q 2) Do :rou go to 19 II 58 6 5 
church? 
Catholic Protestant Atheist/Nothing Muslim Other 
(Q 3) Are you 47 9 29 7 I Jehovah's Witness 
Catholic, Protestant, 
other'? I Agnostic 
I CathJProt 
I Christian who 
claims neither Cath. 
nor Prot. 
(Q 4) Do you YES (of the total of (of the total af "YES" (of the total of (of the total of 
consider yourself a '' YES " responses) responses) "YES" responses) " YES" responses) 
rei igious person? 
Professing Catholic Professing Protestant Professing Muslim Other 
26 8 7 5 I Jehovah 's W1tness 
I Christian 11 ho 
claims neither Cath. 
nor Prot. 
NO (of the total of (of the total of "NO" (of the total of (of the total of 
''NO" responses) responses) "NO" responses) "NO" responses) 
Professing Catholic Professing Protestant Professing Muslim Other 
74 34 I 5 I CathJProt. 
(Q 8) What do the (Refer to data below for more specific details) 
maJonty of French 




Overall Results (100) 
Question Increasing Decreasmg Stagnant Don't Know 
(Q 6) Do you bel ieve Chnstlamty IS 8 62 II 12 
increastng or decreasing? 
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief 
that's taking the place of Christianity? If Don't 
yes, what other religions? Islam Buddhism Sects Other Athe1sm Know 








Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response/? Notes 
(Q I 0) Do )OU believe religion should 4 46 2 7 mtervie"ecs said 
play a role in politics? Why or why not? somethmg about the t\\0 
not workmg \\ell together 
and eausmg conll1ct \\hen 
m1\ed 4 SaJd no because 
there are a lot of rehg1ons 
and 4 sa1d no because 
rcllg1on and politics arc not 
the same. 
One person sa1d, ·'No! This 
IS 2009!" 
Another "No, but I don 't 
know why" 
And yet another said, "No, 
the world leads politics" 
(Q I) Are you fam1llar \~ith any churches 44 7 2 14 of mterv1ewees lnow 
in Orleans? on I)' maJor cathedrals hl..e 
St CrOI\ 
(Q 5) Do you believe there are a lot of 35 13 4 I person sa1d 50150-
Christians m Orleans or in France in Chnstlan!Musllm 
general? 
2 people sa1d ··no, there are 




Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response/? Notes 
Do )OU believe religion should play a role 2 10 I 2 mentioned that this IS too 
m politics? Why or why not? difficult with man) beliefs 
One even said no because 
she belteves the Pope has 
different ideas than the rest 
of the \\Orld. 
One said )'CS, in order to 
change the point ofv1ew of 
thmgs m relauon to 
catastrophes-faith" 
Arc you familiar with any churches in 8 3 2 2 mtcrviewees were 
Orleans? Muslim. 
I interviC\\ee sa1d slhe 
I.. new only St Cro" 
Cathedral 
Do you believe there arc a lot of 4 3 6 Spill with the maJority not 
Christians in Orleans or in France in being sure 
general? 
Aged 35-49 (13) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response/? Notes 
Do you believe religion should play a role 2 II 0 One said that countries 
in politics? Why or why not? where religion is b1g are 
not good countries 
Another sa1d, '·No, \\e are 
a commumty of people. If 
someone does not believe 
the same thing, that causes 
problems with the 
community. That will not 
allow for cho1ce . ., 
One said yes since people 
arc very attached to 
relig1on in general 
Are you familiar with any churches m II I I I interviewee was Muslim 
Orleans? so mentioned how he knew 
Mosques in the area 
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Do ) ou believe there are a lot of 8 2 3 
Chrisllans m Orleans or in France in 
general? 
Aged 50-64 (13) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response/? Notes 
Do you believe religion should play a role 0 13 0 Several mentioned 
in politics? Why or why not? that there are a lot of 
religions. They 
especially mentioned 
the rise of Islam. 
Are you familiar with any churches in 12 I 0 2 said they knew a lot 
Orleans? of churches 
Do you believe there are a lot of 7 0 6 Evenly split between 
Chns11ans in Orleans or in France in yes and unsure 
general? 
Aged 65+ (8) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response/? Notes 
Do you believe religion should play a role 4 4 0 Equal spl it. 
in poliucs? Why or why not? 
2 said that religion should 
play a role in politics but 
not as much as Germany. 
2 mentioned thetr 
dtsagreement with the 
Pope's convicllons 
Are you familiar with any churches in 6 2 0 2 said they were familiar 
Orleans? with all of them 
One specified several 
Catholics and Protestants 
churches. 
I mentioned just the St 
Croix 
Do you believe there are a lot of 5 2 I 2 said there were a lot less 




Aged 18-24 (53) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response!? Notes 
(Q 9) Does the image of these relig1ous 13 34 5 Several said :res. for those 
buildmgs (cathedrals) have an effect on who are Catholic or who 
what one thinks about Catholicism or believe in God. 
Christianity in general? 
" Yes, they give an image 
of life." 
" If there are more churches 
m a City, this city is more 
Catholic." 
''Yes, it reflects the image 
of Christianity." 
"No, people give an 1mage 
of religion, not the 
building itself." 
Aged 25-34 (13) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No response!? Notes 
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious 3 10 0 "One thinks about Jesus 
buildmgs (cathedrals) have an effect on and the Gospel" 
what one thinks about Catholicism or 
Christianity in general? "There is historical 
importance: it shows the 
political power of the 
Church." 
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Aged 35-49 (13) 
Number of Responses 
Quesuon 
YES NO No response/? Notes 
(Q 9} Does the image of these rei igious 4 8 I "They have a good effect 
bUJidmgs (cathedrals} have an e!Tect on on religiOn w1th fallh and 
\~hat one thmks about Catholicism or h1story, but, that also 
Chnstian1ty in general? depend on the person." 
"No, atheists avoid 
cathedrals." 
"One thinks about faith " 
Aged 50-64 (13) 
Number of Responses 
QuestiOn 
YES NO No response/? Notes 
(Q 9} Does the image of these religious 3 8 2 "That depends on the 
buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on person; this is a great 
what one thinks about Catholicism or monument with fa1th as its 
Christianity m general? material." 
"Yes, they make one 
believe that relig1on is a 
good thing, they are 
mystical worl..s of an." 
"Because of pnest 
mvolved 10 pedophilia, 
they g1ve a bad 1mage of 
rehg1on " 
Aged 65+ (8) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES NO No responsefl Notes 
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious 3 4 I "This is just a building that 
bUildings (cathedrals) have an effect on does not have an effect on 
\~hat one thinks about Catholicism or belief. Belief IS m the 
Chris11an1ty 10 general? hean Beliefs are deep in 
the hean " 
"They are more mystical 




Aged 18-24 (SJ) 
Number of Responses 
Quesuon Only to Fam1ly YES/Occasionally NO/Rarely Events 
(Q 2) Do you go to church? 8/3 3513 3 
Catholic Protestant Nothing/Atheist Other Comments 
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, 2 1 3 21 8 5 Muslims, I 









(Q 4) Do you consider 8 45 One girl claimed 
yourself a religious person? to be Protestant 
(4 Catholics ( 18 Cath., and Catholic 
because one parent 
I Muslim, 4 Muslims, is Catholic and the 
other Protestant 
IJehovah 's, I Cath/Prot) She says she IS not 
religious because 
2 Prot.) of her educallon 
Responses 
(Q 8) What do the m8Jonty 23 are unsure or do not 8 thmk that the 4 believe relig1on is II think that Others had d1v1ded 
of French or Orlcana1s !hint.. know French don't not Important to the adherents to opinions-
of religion? think about majority; religions think a "Christians thmt.. 
rei igion at all lot about God, good thmgs about 
I thinks the have respect religion, but 
Orleanais think toward religion athe1sts think 
religion is boring; about bad things 
concerning 
5 believe religion is religion" 




Aged 25-34 (13) 
Number of Responses 
Question Only to Fam1l) 3 Muslims go to the Mosque 
YES/Occasionally NOfRarely Events 
(Q 2) Do you go to church'~ 112 712 I 
Catholic Protestant Noth ing/Atheist Other Comments 
(Q 3) Are you Catholic. 6 0 3 I Chrisuan 
Protestant., other? (doesn' t cla1m 
Prot Or Cath ) 
3 Muslims 
YES NO 
(Q 4) Do you consider 7 6 
yourself a rel igious person? 
(all 3 Muslims said :res) 
Responses 
(Q 8) What do the majority 3 said that everyone has 2 said people 2 said people maJ..e 4 said they d1dn 't I said religion is 
of French or Orlcanais think their own opinions or think of sects fun of religion know for parents and 
of rel igion? that it 's a personal that fewer are 
thing. "One doesn't talk going to church" 
about rellg10n It's 
taboo." 
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Aged 35-49 ( 13) 
Number of Responses 
Question 
YES/Occasionally NO/Rarely Only to Family Events 2 Mushms; I went to the Mosque 
(Q 2) Do you go to 1/0 10/1 I 
church? 
Catholic Protestant Noth 10g/ Atheist Other Comments 
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, 7 I 3 2 Muslims 
Protestant, other? 
YES NO 
(Q 4) Do you consider 2 II 
)'ourself a religious 
person? (I Cath. (I Muslim; 
I Muslim) 6 Catholics; 
I Prot) 
Responses 
(Q 8) What do the "A lot of young people "Everyone has "One doesn 't thmk 2 said, "One "EVCf)'bod) IS 
majonty of French or don 't th10l.. about relig1on the1r own about religion a lot " doesn' t have very very full of 
Orleanais think of af\er communion; they beliefs" respect for belief." 
religion? don't go to church religion" 
anymore." 
70 
Aged 50-64 (13) 
Number of Responses 
Question Only to Family YES/Occasionally NO/Rarely 
Events 
(Q 2) Do you go to church? 415 4/0 0 
Catholic Protestant Nothing/Atheist Other Comments 
(Q 3) Aie you Catholic, 8 3 I I Christian 
Protestant, other'? (doesn't clmm 
Cath. Or Prot) 
YES NO 
(Q 4) Do you cons1der 4 9 
yourself a religious person? 




(Q 8) What do the majority 3 said. "One thinks that One simply said One said, "Like the 2 "Nobody talks 
of French or Orleanais think religion is the opium of that the French majority of France, about religion." 
of rei igion? the people; when one think about one thinks that only 
has difficulties, one religion. the minimum is 
turns to religion" necessary with 
religion Then one 2 "One docsn ' t 
forgets about think about 
religion " religion. And 1f 
one docs, 11's not a 
lot of good 
thmgs." 
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Aged 65+ (8) 
Number of Responses 
Question Only to Family YES/Occasionally NO/Rarely Events 
(Q 2) Do you go to church? 5/1 2/0 0 
Catholic Protestant Nothing/Atheist Other Comments 
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, 5 2 I 0 
Protestant, other" 
YES NO 
(Q 4) Do you consider 5 3 
yourself a rehg1ous person., 
(3 Cath (2 Cath) 
Both (2) Prot.) 
Responses 
(Q 8) What do the majority "Religion doesn' t catch "The French 6 didn 't know. 
of French or Orleanais think people's attention" think about 
of religion? religion." 
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GENERAL QUESTIONS 
Aged 18-U (53) 
Increasing Declining Stagnant Don't Kno\~ 
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is 4 33 8 5 
mcreasing or decreasing? 
(2 said Prot 10 par11cular (2 smd Cath. was in 
was increasmg) decline) 
Which ReligiOn Atheism/Non- Don't Know Comments 
belief/Nothing 
(Q 7) Is there another system of 141slnm 30 9 Most people \\ho said 
belief that 's taking the place of "stagnant" sa1d they 
Christianity? If yes, what other 6 Buddhism didn "t know itlwhat other 
religions? religions were mcreasing. 
4 sects 
~Religion 10 general is in 
2 Juda1sm decline." 
I Scientology "With immigration, one 
can travel more easily 
which leads to a nse of 
other rellg1ons." 
2 said, "People waste 
time on religion. One has 
other things to do." 
Aged 25-34 (13) 
lncreasmg Declining Stagnant Don 't KnO\\ 
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity IS 0 12 0 I 
mcreasing or decreasing? 
Which Religion Atheism/Non- Don't Know Comments 
belief/Nothing 
(Q 7) Is there another system of 5 Islam 10 2 "Atheism IS rising 
belief that's taking the place of because of this 
Christianity? If yes, what other I Buddhism generation." 
religions? 
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Aged 35-49 ( 13) 
Increasmg Declining Stagnant Don 't Know 
(Q 6) Do you believe Chnstianity IS 2 4 3 4 
mcreasing or decreasing? 
(I Prot. increasing in (I Cath. decreasing in 
particular) partiCUlar) 
Which Rellg1on Athe1sm!Non- Don't Know Comments 
belief/Nothing 
(Q 7) Is there another system of 8 Islam 6 I "Christianity is 
belief that's taking the place of increasing because of 
Chnstianity? If yes, what other 3 sects cnscs" 
rellg1ons? 
2 Buddhism "There is a rise m sects 
that steal our money." 
Aged SO-~ (13) 
Increasing Declming Stagnant Don' t Know 
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is I 8 0 0 
mcreasing or decreasmg? 
(3 Prot. increasmg in (4 Cath. decreasing m 
pamcular) particular) 
Which Religion Atheism/Non- Don 't Know Comments 
behefiNothing 
(Q 7) Is there another system of 81slam 5 5 ''There arc young people 
belief that's taking the place of who are begmning to 
Christianity? If yes, what other 3 Agnosticism believe in God. There are 
rellg10ns? Christian associations for 
young people.~ 
Aged 65 + (8) 
lncreasmg Declining Stagnant Don't Know 
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is I 5 0 2 
increasing or decreasing? 
Which Rellg1on Athe1sm!Non- Don't Know Comments 
belief/Nothing 
(Q 7) Is there another system of 2 1slam 3 3 2 said, "There arc fewer 
belief that 's taking the place of practicmg Christians." 
Chnstianity? If yes. what other 2 Buddh1sm 
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